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Many WTO (World Trade Organization) member States have made use of the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. Nevertheless, the debate over the effectiveness of this mechanism is still happening and is an 
important issue to be discussed. This article aims to explain the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. Its timeframe, participation (particularly developing countries) and its achievements are 
used to measure such effectiveness. This article concludes that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
effectively resolves the disputes among the members. 







Tidak sedikit negara-negara anggota WTO (World Trade Organization) memanfaatkan mekanisme 
penyelesaian sengketa dagang internasional di WTO. Namun demikian, perdebatan tentang keefektifan 
mekanisme ini masih terus terjadi dan menjadi isu yang penting untuk dikaji. Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk 
menjelaskan argumentasi efektifitas mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa dagang internasional di WTO. 
Pendekatan waktu, partisipasi (khususnya negara berkembang) dan pencapaian menjadi tolak ukur 
pengukuran efektifitas mekanisme tersebut. Tulisan ini menyimpulkan bahwa mekanisme penyelesaian 
sengketa dagang internasional di WTO berjalan secara efektif. 
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A.   Introduction 
Since first introduced in 1995, many World 
Trade  Organization  (WTO)  member  states 
whether   developed   or   developing   countries 
have made use of the WTO dispute settlement 
system to resolve their trade disputes cases due 
to the main goal of WTO dispute settlement 
system which provides security and predicta- 
bility of the multilateral trading system. It is 
known  that  there  are  two  main  functions  in 
the  WTO:  legislative  and  judicial.  The  former 
function  pertains  to  the  purpose  of  the  WTO 
as a forum in which to accomplish trade agree- 
ments  and  has  been  very  slow  in  actions  due 
to  the  long  deadlock  in  multilateral  negotia- 
tions until the coming through at the Doha 
Ministerial   Conference   in   November   2001. 
The latter function is carried out by the dispute 
settlement  system  which  is  one  of  the  new 
key characteristics of the current global trade 
system and has made the actual achievements. 
Although some scholars claim that WTO dispute 
settlement does not provide an effective dispute 
mechanism,  it  has  been  recognized  by  others 
since the development of this system that WTO 
dispute settlement has generally been successful 
in helping members effectively resolve disputes 
as  well  as  in  obtaining  compliance. Therefore, 
this essay will argue the effectiveness of the 
dispute  settlement  system  in  WTO  by  using 
three  main  key  indicators:  timeframe, 
participation and achievement. By this order, this 
essay will be elaborated into three parts: brief 
overview  of  WTO  dispute  settlement  process, 
the effectiveness of WTO dispute settlement 
system  and  followed  by  the  elaboration  upon 
two proceedings for both successful and un- 
successful. 
B.   Discussion 
1.    WTO Dispute 
It  is  nesessary  to  explain  the  mechanism 
of the WTO dispute settlement in order to know 
the legal framework with relation to the effec- 
tiveness first before angryzing the three 
aferementioned variables in measuring WTO’S 
effectiveness. As it is stated in “Understanding 
the  WTO”,  written  and  published  by  World 
Trade Organization, Information and External 
Relations  Division  in  2011,  dispute  settlement 
is the fundamental practices of the multilateral 
trading system that can contribute to the stability 
of the global economy. It seems that the action 
depends on this system has became a re- 
quirement because the rule could not be enforced 
without  an  instrument  of  settling  disputes  or 
at least it would be less effective. Thus, this 
system  emphasizes  the  rule  of  law  which  is 
based  on  clearly-defined rules,  with  timetables 
for  completing  a  case  in  order  to  make  the 
trading  system  more  secure  and  predictable.1 
Accordingly,  the  dispute  settlement  mechanism 
is   called   the   judicial   body   of   the   WTO 
mechanism. Despite the fact that this system 
provides a legal aspect to accelerate resolution 
of disputes and prevents deliberate ‘blocking 
actions’,   it   also   has   a   power   to   organize 
panels, adopt or reject panel and Appeal Body 
(AB) reports, maintain surveillance of the 
implementation of decided rulings, and authorize 
limited  trade  transactions.2   This  authority 
derives from the Articles XXII and XXIII of the 
GATT which basically  transformed  the  dispute 
settlement process from a diplomatic or a power- 
based approach into a legalized or a rule-based 







1          World Trade Organization, 2011, Understanding the WTO, World Trade Organization, Switzerland, p. 55. 
2 Biranchi Narayan P. Panda, “Is Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organisation an Adjudicative or Adjustive?”, http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=2055725, retrieved on 21 April 2013. 
3          Kim Van der Borght, “The Review of the WTO Understanding on Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the Current Debate”, American 
University International Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1999, p. 1223.
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Furthermore, there are three stages in the 
dispute settlement regime of the WTO.4  The first 
stage is the consultation stage which has been said 
as the source of the dispute settlement system 
because it starts the WTO dispute settlement 
system   action.   In   other   words,   the   process 
will start when the complainant requests for 
consultation5 through the questions that describe 
their objections to certain trade actions. In this 
stage, the parties are required to negotiate to attain 
a mutually satisfactory solution within 60 days.6 
The second stage is the panel proceedings stage 
which  consists  of  litigation. This  phase  occurs 
when the parties have failed to make a mutually 
satisfactory solution here the complainant can 
request for the establishment of a panel to hear the 
dispute.7  The third and final stage is, depending 
on the outcome of the case, the implementation 
stage. In this stage, the panel will issue an interim 
report8 after the conclusion of the case and then a 
final report will be sent to the Dispute Settlement 
Body (“OSU”) for adoption by consensus unless 
the other party appeals.9 The case will finish when 
the defendant takes an advantage from the case 
in the appeal. However, the Appellate Body will 
call upon the defendant to bring its trade measures 
into conformity with the covered agreement in 
question, if the case benefits the complainant.10 
The appellate report also goes for adoption by 
the DSU. If it is impracticable for the defendant 
to comply immediately, the defendant is given 
a reasonable time within which to comply11  and 
failing compliance the complainant may request 
for a compliance panel. 
2.    Effectiveness of WTO Dispute Settlement 
System 
It is strongly argued that the WTO dispute 
settlement is outstandingly effective. However, 
there is still rejection of this opinion with  regards 
to the length of process and the lack of retaliatory 
power particularly for developing countries. The 
legal proceedings in the WTO dispute settlement 
take often a relatively long time in duration and 
might require additional costs. Moreover, the 
limited retaliatory authority from developing 
countries   might   deter   making   complaints   if 
there is no hope for their views of imposing 
rulings in their favor, especially since there is no 
mechanism for collective punishment of recal- 
citrant respondents. Furthermore, small develop- 
ing countries may workout self-constraint in 
blaming their struggles in order not to threaten the 
privileges that they rely on, including development 
aid  and  unilateral  trade  preferences.12  All  of 
these arguments are constructed to counter the 
effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement. 
a)   Timeframe 
One of the indicators to measure the 
effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement 
is time duration. Opinion whish have said that 
the panel in the WTO dispute settlement takes 
too long time or even prolong the proceedings 
is simply not true. As a matter of fact that the 
WTO disputes run significantly faster, on an 
average, than cases in other international or 
regional organizations, such as the ICJ, the 
ECJ and NAFTA.13  “The average timeframe 
for WTO panel proceedings is 10 months,
 
 
4 Gosego Rockfall Lekgowe, “The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Why it Does not Work for Developing Countries?”, http://dx.doi. 
org/10.2139/ssrn.2045470, accessed on 21 April 2013. 
5          See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Art. 4(1), (2) and (3), Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 
2 (‘DSU’). 
6          DSU Art. 4(7). 
7          DSU Art. 4(7) and Art. 6(1) and (2). 
8          DSU Art. 16. 
9          DSU Art. 14. 
10        DSU Art. 19(1). 
11        DSU Art. 21(3). 
12        Henrik Horn, et al., “Is The Use Of The WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased?”, http://www.econ-law.se/Papers/Disputes000117.PDF, 
accessed on 21 April 2013. 
13        Yonov Frederick Agah, “WTO Dispute Settlement Body Developments in 2010: An Analysis”, Trade Law & Development, Vol. 4, No. 1, 
2012, p. 243.
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excluding the time it takes to compose a panel 
and translate reports. Compare this to the 
ICJ’s 4 years, the ECJ’s 2 years and NAFTA’s 
Chapters 20 and 11 proceedings of 3 years and 
5 years, respectively”.14  It is also faster than 
the investor-state arbitrations at the World 
Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes, known as ICSID. On 
average, it takes over 3 1/2 years for ICSID 
to deal with the cases.15 Time spent by parties 
making their submissions is not the sole 
reason for this but it is because of the length 
of  time  needed  by  the  decision-makers  to 
do their work. “Surprisingly, it takes about 
14 months between the last hearing and the 
issuance  of  an  ICSID  award.”16   Yet  there 
are some WTO panel proceedings that have 
taken  longer  than  10  months,  and  even 
almost a year, these are exceptional cases. 
There are two high profile cases have taken 
several  years  to  go  through  the  system: 
the  “Airbus”  and  “Boeing”  cases  because 
they  are  marked  as  the  most  difficult and 
expensive cases. And they do not represent 
the norm which is the only reference that the 
WTO dispute settlement system considers. 
Therefore,  time  limits  in  the  WTO  fair 
quite well when compared with dispute 
procedures   in   international   organizations 
for   matters   of   comparable   complexity. 
Furthermore,  it  has  been  recognized 
that the WTO dispute settlement takes an 
appropriate time during the dispute process, 
which means that there is no deliberate delay 
or prolongation occurring in that system 
unless the parties have designed so. It could 
be seen, for instance, from the description 
statistic data occurred between 1995 and 2010 
that shows the average applied time for every 
phase process in the WTO dispute settlement 
as follows:17 
1.  In the consultation stage, the average 
time that a country with disputes needs 
is around five to six months from the 
date of request for consultation until 
the date the panel was established, 
while the statutory deadline is two 
months. 
2. Next phase is panel which has 15 
months as an average process time. 
In this phase, the statutory states that 
the duration of the panel process is 
six  months  which  can  be  extended 
to nine months if the parties need it, 
even though, the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding tends to propose with- 
out any further extension.18 
3.  The  next  stage  is  Appellate  Body 
(AB) process. As it is stated in the 
statutory deadline for its completion 
is 60 days, but with the possibility to 
extend it to 90 days. The data shows 
that the average duration is 90.3 days. 
“On 113 out of 127 occasions, that 
is, 89% of the total number, the AB 
completed its work within 91 days.” 
4.  Then turn to Compliance panels (Art. 
21.5 DSU) which have a statutory 90 
days-deadline with the possibility of 
extension but there is no maximum 
delay of process.19 In practice 
compliance panels take on average 
around eight months to complete their 
work. 
5. Finally,  it  is  about  the  average 
reasonable   period   of   time   (RPT) 
for implementation of the WTO 
adjudicating bodies’ recommenda- 
tions. The average time for RPT when 
agreed bilaterally is 9.29 months 
which  is  awarded  by  the  arbitrator 
in the awards circulated, while the 
average time for RPT when awarded 
by  arbitrator  is  11.7  months  which
 
 
14        Ibid. 
15        Anthony Sinclair, et al., “ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does it Take?”, global Arbitration Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 5, 2009, pp. 18-20. 
16        Ibid. 
17        Henrik Horn, et al., “The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995 2010: Some Descriptive Statistics”, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 45, No. 
6, 2011, p. 32. 
18        DSU Art. 12(9). 
19        DSU Art. 21(5).
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is a total length of agreed period 
between parties of RPT during which 
implementation must occur.20 
From the aforementioned data, it could be 
stated that between 1995 and 2010, the WTO 
dispute settlement have not intentionally 
prolonged the proceeding unless the parties 
required so. Thereby, in general, the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism could be 
considered as an effective system in terms of 
timeframe. 
b)   Participation and Achievement 
Another indicator is the participation 
aspect, particularly for developing countries,21 
and its achievements.22 It is believed that one of 
the principle factors in influencing developing 
countries’ participation and compliance with 
WTO panel and appellate body decision is 
the effectiveness, at least in principle, of the 
dispute settlement system in resolving disputes 
between countries of diverging political and 
economic power.23 Point of fact, in 2010 
developing countries made for the majority of 
the cases initiated.24 For instance, developing 
countries  were  complainants  in  more  than 
45% of cases and defendants in more than 
43% between 1995 and 2009.25 Moreover, 
after two decades of practice, this system has 
contributed significantly to the governance of 
global trade interactions with great benefits 
and clear adjudication process and as a result, 
many countries have developed innovative 
actions for managing everyday problems 
arising in worldwide trade.26 For example, the 
preparation of South Korea government for 
the case against US anti-dumping measures 
on colour televisions confirms that demands 
close collaboration between officials and 
business people has a positive impact on 
domestic trade policy-making. The result of 
this dispute leads South Korea to be more 
confident participation in the WTO and more 
positive view of the benefits of ‘globalization’ 
of the economy.27 Another good illustration is 
the successful allegation of Costa Rica of its 
rights under the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing against US safeguard actions which 
reflects a signal to other developing countries 
that the WTO dispute settlement system 
would  protect  proportionally  the  interests 
of all members.28  This suggests that so far 
the WTO has achieved its main objective, 
namely, settles disputes between members so 
as to provide “security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system.”29 
Furthermore,  the  WTO  dispute 
settlement system generally has an admirable 
compliance proof30  which shows that the 
standard compliance rate within ten years is 
83%.31  Despite the fact the number of new
 
20        The arbitrators have to respect the statutory deadline. It should be noted that the DSU provides a guideline to the Arbitrators when it comes 
to determine the RPT: it should not be longer than 15 months. The DSU admits, however, that the RPT can extend beyond 15 months if 
need be. See DSU Art. 21(3c). 
21        This is because of many arguments that the WTO dispute settlement does not benefit the developing countries. See Gosego Rockfall 
Lekgowe, Loc.cit. 
22        Both participation (which is more quantitative) and achievement indicators seem to be relevant for examining the effectiveness of 
WTO dispute settlement. See Konstantinos D. Magliveras, “Measuring the Effectiveness of International Organizations: A Theoretical 
Approach”, Paper, the 69th Midwest Political Sciences Association Conference, Chicago, 31 March to 3 April 2011. 
23        Douglas Ierley, “Developing Countries Compliance with and Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Another Look at the 
Dispute over Bananas”, Law & Policy in International Business, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2002, p. 615. 
24        See Yonov Frederick Agah, Loc.cit. 
25        Thomas Bernauer, et al., 2010, The World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism – Analysis and Problems, Center for 
Comparative and International Studies, Zurich, p. 4. 
26        Roberto Echandi, 2013, How to Successfully Manage Conflicts and Prevent Dispute Adjudication in International Trade, International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Switzerland, p. 3. 
27        World Trade Organization, “Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: Case Studies”, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/ 
casestudies_e/introduction_e.htm#fntext1, accessed on 22 April 2013. 
28        Ibid. 
29        DSU Art. 3(2). 
30        William J. Davey, “Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2009, p. 119. 
31        William J. Davey, “The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years”, Journal International Economic Law, Vol. 17, No. 8, 
2005, p. 46.
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cases has slightly increased, some of the ten 
problem disputes prominent have since been 
settled during ten years period.32 This current 
compliance rate achievement has a significant 
impact on an international state-to-state 
dispute settlement system. In addition, this 
successful rate in the WTO system is clearly 
better than the success rate in the International 
Court of Justice.33  Moreover, the successful 
number  of  consultations  in  WTO  cases  is 
also remarkable. For instance, there are 414 
registered consultation requests within 10 
years  of  the  new  regime  of WTO  dispute 
settlement  operation  which  is  higher  than 
with the GATT (around 300). 125 of these 
414 requests led to a panel examination and 
adopted panel reports. “Of these 125 panel 
reports, 78 have been appealed. In 85% of 
appeals, panel reports were reversed or modi- 
fied.” In almost 90% of adopted dispute reports 
at least one violation of legal obligations 
under the WTO was found.34  This, one at a 
time, proves an advanced level of appeals and 
a significant achievement rate of appeals. 
The  outstanding  achievement  of WTO 
dispute settlement, therefore, indicates that 
many countries of WTO members are using 
and want to use the WTO system to resolve 
disputes due to the believe that the system has 
made an important and a significant input to 
the development of international trade law. 
And, all of this fact seems to be a mark of its 
success.35 Thus, that WTO dispute settlement 
is not only effective to convey an advancement 
to adjust the trade barrier and shorten the 
duration of the dispute, but also remarkable 
that the dispute system has been relatively 
successful to resolve trade disputes.36 
3. Successful and Unsuccessful Proceedings: 
A Brief Overview 
Thirdly, an elaboration upon the successful 
and  unsuccessful  cases  seems  to  be  important 
part of this discussion in order to support the 
arguments that state although many cases have 
been successfully resolved under the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism, there are still some cases 
that have taken a long time to sort out or where no 
final decision has been made. 
a)   Successful Cases 
1)   The Costa Rica’s Successful Case 
This case was entitled United States — 
Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man- 
Made Fibre Underwear which the short one 
is US – Underwear (Dispute DS24). The 
compliant of this case was Costa Rica whereas 
United States was a respondent with India as 
third party. This case has been claimed by 
scholars  as  a  successful  case  because  this 
case showed how the dispute process worked 
under legal power approach which resolved 
the problem effectively. 
On 22 December 1995, Costa Rica re- 
quested consultations with the United States 
concerning US restrictions on textile imports 
from  Costa  Rica.  Costa  Rica  alleged  that 
these restrictions were in violation of the ATC 
agreement. Therefore, on 5 March 1996, the 
DSB (Dispute Settlement Body) established 
a panel at its meeting based on Costa Rica’s 
request. India reserved its third-party rights. 
On 4 April 1996, the Panel was composed. 
The report of the panel was circulated to 
members on 8 November 1996. The Panel 
found that the US restraints were not valid. 
Then,  On  11  November  1996,  Costa  Rica 




32        See John H. Jackson, et al., 2008, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations (5th Edition), Thomson/West, St. Paul, p. 284. 
33        See Tom Ginsburg and Richard H. McAdams, “Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution”, WM. 
& Mary Law Review, Vol. 45, 2004, p. 1229. 
34        See Thomas Bernauer, et al., 2010, Op.cit. 
35        See Donald McRae, “Measuring the Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement System”, AJWH, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2008, p. 3. 
36        Davis Christina, “WTO Dispute Settlement as a Tool for Conflict Management”, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1668819, accessed on 23 April 
2013.
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aspect of the Panel report. The report of the 
Appellate Body was circulated to Members 
on 10 February 1997. The Appellate Body 
upheld the appeal by Costa Rica on that 
particular point. The Appellate Body report 
and the Panel report as modified by the 
Appellate Body report were adopted by the 
DSB on 25 February 1997 with three points 
in the summary of key Panel/AB Findings 
First: ATC Art. 6.10 (transitional safeguard 
measures - prospective application): The 
Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s finding 
and concluded that in the absence of express 
authorization, the plain language of Art. 6.10 
create a presumption that a measure may be 
applied only prospectively, and thus may not 
be backdated so as to apply as of the date 
of publication of the importing Member’s 
request for consultation. Second: ATC Art. 
6.2 (transitional safeguard measures - serious 
damage and causation): The Panel refrained 
from making a finding on whether the United 
States  demonstrated  “serious  damage” 
within the meaning of Art. 6.2, stating that 
ATC Art. 6.3 does not provide sufficient and 
exclusive guidance in this case. However, the 
Panel found that the United States had not 
demonstrated actual threat of serious damage, 
and therefore violated Art. 6. The Panel also 
found that the United States failed to comply 
with  its  obligation  to  examine  causality 
under Art. 6.2. Third: GATT Art. X:2 (trade 
regulations - enforcement): Although 
disagreeing with the Panel’s application of 
Art. X:2 to the issue of backdating under ATC 
Art. 6.10, the Appellate Body agreed with 
the Panel’s general interpretation of Art. X:2 
that  certain  country-specific measures  may 
constitute “measures of general application” 
under Art. X:2, although a company or 
shipment-specific measure may not. It also 
noted the fundamental importance of Art. X:2 
which reflects the “principle of transparency” 
and has “due process dimensions”.37 
In terms of implementation of adopted 
reports, at the meeting of the DSB on 10 April 
1997, the US informed the meeting that the 
measure which had been the subject of this 
dispute had expired on 27 March 1997 and 
had not been renewed, effectively meaning 
that the US had immediately complied with 
the recommendations of the DSB.38 
2.    US – Zeroing (Korea) 
This   is   another   successful   case   for 
South Korea because the United States as 
respondent had fully implemented the DSB’s 
recommendations and rulings within the 
reasonable period of time agreed by the parties 
on 19 December 2011. After following every 
stage in dispute settlement process which 
started from the consultation on 24 November 
2009 followed by the establishment of panel 
on 18 May 2010, Korea had won this case 
against United States.39 Korea requested 
consultations with the United States regarding 
their use of zeroing in three antidumping 
cases involving certain products from Korea, 
namely, stainless steel plate in coils, stainless 
steel sheet and strip in coils, and diamond 
sawblades and parts thereof. 
Korea  claimed  that  the  effect  of  the 
use of zeroing by the US Department of 
Commerce  (USDOC)  in  these  three  cases 
had been either to artificially create margins
 
 
37        See World Trade Organization, “United States — Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear”, https://www.wto. 
org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds24_e.htm,  accessed on 23 April 2013. 
38        US – Underwear Appellate Body Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/ 
AB/R, adopted 25 February 1997, DSR 1997:I, 11 & US – Underwear Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton 
and Man-made Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/R, adopted 25 February 1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS24/AB/R, DSR 
1997:I, 31. See World Trade Organization, “United States — Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear”, https:// 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds24_e.htm,  accessed on 23 April 2013. 
39        See World Trade Organization, “United States — Use of Zeroing in Anti-Dumping Measures Involving Products from Korea”, https:// 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds402_e.htm,  accessed on 23 April 2013.
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of  dumping  where  none  would  otherwise 
had been found, or to inflate margins of 
dumping. In its consultation request, Korea 
alleged  that  the  USDOC’s  use  of  zeroing 
in its final determinations, amended final 
determinations, and anti-dumping duty orders 
in the three cases in question was inconsistent 
with the United States’ obligations under 
Article  VI  of  GATT  1994  and Articles  1, 
2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, and 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement.40 
Finally, the Panel found that the United 
States acted inconsistently with the first 
sentence of Art. 2.4.2 by using the zeroing 
methodology in calculating certain margins 
of dumping in the context of the three original 
investigations   at   issue.   Therefore,   after 
getting  eight  months  of  reasonable  period 
for  the  United  States  to  comply  with  the 
DSB recommendations and rulings, United 
States finally notified that they had fully 
implemented  the  recommendations  on  19 
December 2011.41 
b)   Unsuccessful Cases 
1) EC  and  Certain  Member  States  – 
Large Civil Aircraft Case 
This case is recognized as an important 
issue and high stakes which lead to the 
prolongation and seems to be unsuccessful 
case in the WTO dispute settlement. This case 
which was known as European Communities 
— Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft (Dispute DS316) has been started 
since 6 October 2004 with the consultation 
from the United States (complainant) with the 
Governments of Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, and Spain (the “member states”), 
and with the European Communities (“EC”) 
(respondent) concerning measures affecting 
trade in large civil aircraft.42  According to 
the request for consultations from the United 
States, measures by the EC and the member 
States provide subsidies that are inconsistent 
with  their  obligations  under  GATT  1994: 
Art. III:4, XVI:1, XXIII:1 Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures: Art. 1, 2, 3.1, 3.2, 
5, 6.3,6.4.43 
The panel for this case was established 
on 20 July 2005 which is more than two 
months  after  the  United  States  request  for 
the establishment of a panel because there 
was a differed establishment of panel on 13 
June 2005. Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
Japan and Korea reserved their third-party 
rights. Then, by 23 September 2005, there 
was a meeting where the DSB initiated the 
procedures provided in Annex V of the SCM 
Agreement. One of the United State request 
points is asking for the Director-General to 
compose the panel on 7 October 2005. But 
the  Director-General  rejected  himself  on 
this matter on 17 October 2005 and Deputy 
Director acted in place of the Director- 
General to compose the panel. In this stage, it 
seems that the complexity of the matters had 
influenced the prolongation in composing the 
panel.44 
In  this  case,  the  panel  would  not  be 
able to complete its work within six months 
from 13 April 2006 due to the substantive 
and procedural complexities involved in this 
dispute.45  However, the panel completed the 
work at the end of April 2010. In this sense, 
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41        Panel Report, United States – Use of Zeroing in Anti-Dumping Measures Involving Products from Korea, WT/DS402/R, adopted 24 
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42        See World Trade Organization, “European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft”, https://www.wto.org/ 
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45        Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/ 
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the case. Moreover, the result of this case was 
still on the status of compliance proceedings 
ongoing, which means that the case has not 
been resolved yet.46  It can be seen from the 
implementation stage, that the United States 
claimed that the European Union and certain 
member States had failed to comply with the 
DSB’s recommendations and rulings, thus 
they requested approval by the DSB to take 
countermeasures under Article 22 of the DSU 
and Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement on 9 
December 2011.47 
Even though, the European Union 
objected to the level of postponement of 
concessions  or  other  obligations  included 
in the United States’ request at the DSB 
meeting on 22 December 2011, and claimed 
that the principles and procedures set forth 
in Article  22.3  of  the  DSU  had  not  been 
followed. The  European  Union  also  stated 
that the United States’ proposal is not allowed 
under the covered agreements. The European 
Union requested the matter be referred to 
arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU. 
The DSB agreed that the matter raised by 
the European Union in its statement at that 
meeting was referred to arbitration as required 
by Article 22.6 of the DSU.48 
Then, on 19 January 2012, the United 
States and the European Union requested the 
Arbitrator to suspend its work.  As stated in 
paragraph 6 of the Agreed Procedures, in the 
event that the DSB, following a proceeding 
under Article  21.5  of  the  DSU,  rules  that 
the measure taken to comply does not exist 
or is inconsistent with a covered agreement, 
either  party  may  request  the  Article  22.6 
arbitrator to resume its work.  In accordance 
with the parties’ joint request, the Arbitrator 
suspended the arbitration proceedings from 
20 January 2012 until either party requests 
their resumption.49 
Finally, this case tends to be the long 
taking time case in the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism which has not been 
resolved yet, and could be reflected as the 
unsuccessful case. 
2)   US – Shrimp and Sawblades Case 
This case which was known as United 
States  — Anti-Dumping  Measures  on 
Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades from China 
(Dispute DS422) seems to be unsuccessful 
case.50  Although the current status released 
by WTO as implementation notified by 
respondent which was United States, China as 
complainant did not share the United States’ 
view, thereby, China pressed the United States 
to respect its obligation. 
This case began with China requested 
consultations  On  28  February  2011  with 
the United States regarding the latter’s anti- 
dumping measures on certain frozen warm 
water  shrimp  from  China.    China  alleged 
that the US Department of Commerce’s 
(“USDOC”) use of zeroing in the original 
investigation and several administrative 
reviews  to  calculate  dumping  margins  for 
the subject imports is inconsistent with the 
United States’ obligations under Article VI:1 
and VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 1, 
2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 5.8, 9.2, 9.3, and 9.4 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
On 22 July 2011, China requested 
complementary consultations with the United 
States with regard to the zeroing practice by 
the USDOC in its anti-dumping measures on
 
46        Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/R, 
adopted 1 June 2011, as modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS316/AB/R. 
47        World Trade Organization, “European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft”, https://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds316_e.htm,  accessed on 23 April 2013. 
48        Ibid. 
49        Ibid. 
50        There are six third parties involved in this case: European Union; Honduras; Japan; Korea, Republic of; Thailand; Vietnam. See World 
Trade Organization, “United States — Anti-Dumping Measures on Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades from China”, https://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds422_e.htm,  accessed on 23 April 2013. 
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diamond sawblades and parts thereof from 
China with the considerations that the zeroing 
practices in the cited measures are inconsistent 
with the United States’ obligations under 
Article  VI:1  and  VI:2  of  the  GATT  1994 
and Articles 1, 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 5.8, 9.2, 9.3, 
and  9.4  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
On 13 October 2011, China requested the 
establishment of panel.  Then, on 13 October 
2011, China and the United States informed 
the DSB of an Agreement on Procedures. 
At  its  meeting  on  25  October  2011, 
the DSB established a panel. The European 
Union,  Honduras,  Japan,  Korea,  Thailand 
and Vietnam reserved their third party rights. 
Following  the  agreement  of  the  parties, 
the  panel  was  composed  on  21  December 
2011. On 8 June 2012, the panel report was 
circulated to Members with some summary 
key findings as follows: 
1.  Therefore  the  Panel  concluded  that 
the United States had acted inconsis- 
tently with its obligations under this 
provision. 
2. The Panel rejected China’s claim 
concerning the separate rate, but noted 
that  the  calculation  of  the  separate 
rate on the basis of individual margins 
calculated with zeroing necessarily 
incorporated  the  WTO-inconsistent 
zeroing methodology. 
At  its  meeting  on  23  July  2012,  the 
DSB adopted the panel report. Then, on 27 
July 2012, both parties had agreed with the 
reasonable period of time for the United States 
to implement the DSB recommendations and 
rulings shall be 8 months. Accordingly, the 
reasonable period of time expired on 23 March 
2013. Finally, in terms of implementation of 
adopted reports the United States informed 
the DSB that it had implemented the DSB 
recommendations and rulings within the 
reasonable period of time at the DSB meeting 
on 26 March 2013. However, China did not 
agree with United States’ view that it had fully 
implemented the DSB recommendations. 
Furthermore, China advocated the United 
States to honour its obligation.51 
 
 
C.   Conclusion 
In brief, it has been proven that the WTO 
dispute settlement is an effective instrument for 
resolving the disputes between WTO member 
countries.  In  terms  of  timeframe,  the  system 
works in a proper and ordered way. The increase 
in participation particularly from developing 
countries and the outstanding achievement in 
resolving the disputes enabled this system to reach 
effectively its main objective namely, to settle 
disputes between members states so as to provide 
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